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Note
Why Limit a Good Thing? A Proposal to
Apply the California Antilapse Statute
to Revocable Living Trusts
by
ROCHELLE A. SMITH*
[T]he law of trusts is living law.
- Austin Wakeman Scott'
America is in the midst of a "nonprobate revolution."' 2 The goal of
most estate planning is to provide for the quickest, most private, least
expensive, uncontested distribution of assets possible.3 Viewed as repug-
nant to these goals, probate, the judicial process that validates an instru-
ment as a decedent's last will4 and governs estate administration,5 has
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1984, University of California, Los Angeles; M.A.
1986, California State University, Northridge.
1. 1 AusTIN W. ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS at xxv (4th ed.
1987).
2. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succes-
sion, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984). Professor Langbein asserts that
over the course of the twentieth century, persistent tides of change have been lapping
at the once-quiet shores of the law of succession. Probate, our court-operated system
for transferring wealth at death, is declining in importance. Institutions that admin-
ister non-court modes of transfer are displacing the probate system.
Id.
3. GEORGE M. TURNER, REVOCABLE TRUSTS 1-2 (1983). Mr. Turner identifies seven
goals in estate planning: minimizing the cost, time, complexity, total tax liability, and likeli-
hood of contests involved in estate settlement while maximizing family privacy and providing
adequate management and control both during the lifetime and after the death of either or
both spouses. IaL
4. PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 169
(1987).
5. Professor Langbein explains:
The term "probate" originally applied only to the proceedings used to prove
(probare) a will; it stood in contrast to "administration," which comprehended all
subsequent proceedings winding up the estate. In modern American usage, "pro-
bate" embraces "administration" and hence extends to the administration of both
testate and intestate estates.
[1391]
become the object of widespread public discontent.6 Because the probate
process can be expensive,7 expose private family matters to the public,8
take years to conclude,9 and cause families trauma and anxiety, 10 more
Langbein, supra note 2, at 1108 n.1 (citing MAX RHENSTEIN & MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 478 (1971)).
6. Professor Langbein writes, "As long as probate reform still calls for probate, it will
not go far enough for the tastes of many transferors." Id. at 1116-17. See also TURNER, supra
note 3, at 11 ("There is probably no area in the practice of law which raises more unsavory
comments from the public than that of the probate system.").
In 1965 Norman Dacey's do-it-yourself living trust manual, How to Avoid Probate,
reached number two on the New York Times best-seller list (second to Masters & Johnson's
Human Sexuality). NORMAN DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE 1 (rev. ed. 1990). Now in its
New Edition for the 1990"s, the continued popularity of How to Avoid Probate attests to public
discontent with probate. Mr. Dacey estimates that over 12.5 million trusts have been estab-
lished using the tear-out trust instruments provided in his manual. Id. at 6.
7. See TURNER, supra note 3, at 11-14 (stating that in addition to fees and expenses of
the state inheritance tax appraiser, charges for accountants, court fees, and the possible ex-
pense of retaining other professionals such as private appraisers, the area of "greatest expense
is that of fees paid to personal representatives and attorneys"). Mr. Turner listed seventeen
"common areas in which extraordinary fees are regularly allowed." Id. at 1-2 (1990 Supp.). A
small sampling of such common legal services that may warrant "extraordinary" fees and
commissions to an executor or attorney include sales or mortgages of real or personal prop-
erty, preparation of estate, inheritance, income, sales, or other tax returns, carrying on or
winding up the business of the decedent, cancellation of leases, petitions for instructions, deter-
mination of title holdings, and evaluation procedures for valuation of property. Id See also E.
WILLIAM CARR, REVOCABLE TRUSTS 38, 43 (1980) ("A revocable trust saves probate ex-
penses because at the settlor's death the property in the trust is not subject to the executor's
commissions and attorney's fee." The trustor also avoids other probate expenses such as court
costs and appraisers' fees.).
8. TURNER, supra note 3, at 6-7. Mr. Turner contrasts the "near-obscene" newspaper
accounts of the disposition of Natalie Wood's estate with the low-key coverage of Bing
Crosby's estate disposition. Whereas at probate Wood's will became a matter of public record
enabling reporters to expose every provision in gruesome detail, Crosby disposed of his entire
estate through a trust. Thus, the press was unable to ascertain the size or distribution of the
estate. Mr. Turner quotes Crosby's attorney referring to the trust as "a private vaill." Id. at 7.
See also Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App. 3d 777, 783-84, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1977). Hold-
ing that it had no statutory or inherent authority to prohibit public access to probate files, the
court denied a petition to seal the probate files of William Randolph Hearst's will despite
evidence that members of the Hearst family would be endangered if their names (some
changed by marriage) and addresses became public. Id The court explained that testators
"can eschew court-regulated devices for transmission of inherited wealth and rely on private
arrangements such as inter vivos gifts, joint tenancies and so-called 'living' or grantor trusts."
Id
9. TURNER, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that even a simple will may take from two to four
years to probate).
10. Mr. Turner posits:
The length of time for settling the estate is often as physiologically and psychologi-
cally devastating to a family as is the cost imposed by taxation. There appears to be a
direct correlation between the length of time it takes to settle an estate and the anxi-
ety and stress level experienced by the family.
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and more estate planners are counseling clients to avoid probate by using
will substitutes instead of wills to distribute the bulk of their estates.1
Will substitutes are instruments that simulate wills by allowing a
donor to pass property at her death while retaining control over the
property during her life.12 Will substitutes include pension plans, life
insurance policies, and joint accounts, 1 3 but perhaps the most versatile is
the revocable living trust.' 4 Also known as an "inter vivos trust," a "rev-
ocable living trust"1 5 refers to a trust that a trustor creates during her
lifetime and that the trustor may modify or revoke at any time until her
death.' 6 Using a revocable living trust, a donor may name herself as the
immediate beneficiary to enjoy substantial lifetime control over her
wealth and also specify a remainder beneficiary to receive the trust
corpus at her death. 17 In contrast to most other will substitutes, the rev-
ocable living trust is not asset specific; thus, like a will, a revocable living
trust can be used to pass a wide variety of assets upon a donor's death.' 8
The chief reason for replacing wills with revocable living trusts, as
well as other will substitutes, is to avoid probate.' 9 Revocable living
trusts "pass [property] in accordance with their terms ... and are not
subject to estate administration." 20 The trustee designated in the trust
usually manages the assets without court supervision.21 In other words,
revocable living trusts avoid the delay, publicity, and expense that ac-
company a court proceeding. 22 Additionally, revocable living trusts and
other will substitutes may be created without observing the strict testa-
11. Id. at 7-10; CARR, supra note 7, at 5, 22; JOHN R. COHAN & GERALDINE S. HEM-
MERLING, INTER Vivos TRUSTS 88 (1975); DACEY, supra note 6, at 23-36, 41-47; JAMES F.
FARR & JACKSON W. WRIGHT, JR., AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 75-83 (4th ed. 1979);
HAROLD WEINSTOCK, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND TECH-
NIQUES 142 (3d ed. 1988); Langbein, supra note 2, at 1108, 1113.
12. Langbein, supra note 2, at 1109.
13. Id. Professor Langbein identifies four will substitutes that "constitute the core of the
nonprobate system: life insurance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and revocable trusts.
When properly created, each is functionally indistinguishable from a will." Id.
14. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
15. "[A] revocable living trust and an inter vivos trust are basically the same term with
one being the English form and the second being the Latin form." TURNER, supra note 3, at 4.
16. COHAN & HEMMERLING, supra note 11, at 80.
17. CARR, supra note 7, at 22.
18. Langbein, supra note 2, at 1115 n.32 ("Revocable inter vivos trusts need not be asset-
specific; they can apply, as broadly as a will, to any and all forms of property.").
19. Langbein, supra note 2, at 1115-16. "The probate system has earned a lamentable
reputation for expense, delay, clumsiness, makework, and worse." Id. at 1116.
20. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 162. Professor Haskell explains that "[w]ill substitutes
pass free of the regulation to which estate assets are subject. There is no rhyme or reason for
this difference in treatment; ... the dichotomization of the economic estate evolved without
design." Id.
21. Id.; COHAN & HEMMERLING, supra note 11, at 91-92.
22. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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mentary formalities required of wills.23 A will may be declared invalid if
it is not executed and witnessed in strict compliance with state statutes,24
but there are numerous relatively simple ways to establish a trust.25
Thus, because of their versatility and the fact that they can be created
and implemented with ease and efficiency free of probate, revocable liv-
ing trusts have become a popular will substitute.26
However, by electing to use a revocable living trust the unwary trus-
tor ultimately may not achieve the distribution she intended. In Califor-
nia, if a trust beneficiary dies before the trustor and the trustor neglects
to revoke the trust or name an alternative beneficiary, the funds intended
for the beneficiary (now deceased) pass not according to the trustor's
will, but rather according to the beneficiary's will (or to the beneficiary's
intestate heirs if there is no will).27 Unfortunately, distribution under the
predeceased beneficiary's will may be contrary to the wishes of the trus-
tor; assets may pass to persons that the trustor does not know or like, or
even to the beneficiary's creditors.28
While at first this may appear to be a trivial problem (after all,
someone is benefitting), one goal of trust law is to carry out the intent of
the trustor.29 It is not unreasonable to assume that the average trustor
23. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 127; Langbein, supra note 2, at 1115.
24. See 2 WILLIAM PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 19.4, at 63-65 (William J.
Bowe & Douglas H. Parker eds., 1960).
25. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 69-71. California Probate Code section 15200 provides:
[A] trust may be created by any of the following methods:
(a) A declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds the property as
trustee.
(b) A transfer of property by the owner during the owner's lifetime to another per-
son as trustee.
(c) A testamentary transfer of property by the owner to another person as trustee.
(d) An exercise of a power of appointment to another person as trustee.
(e) An enforceable promise to create a trust.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15200 (West 1991).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
27. See, e.g., Randall v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 255,
119 P.2d 754, 757 (1941) (A trustor gave a remainder interest to his grand-nephew who failed
to survive the trustor. At the trustor's death, the grand-nephew's wife took the interest as the
grand-nephew's sole heir.).
28. Even if the predeceased beneficiary had designated a residuary taker, creditors are
satisfied before the "residue" is determined; "a residue does not exist as long as there are debts
which are unpaid, or other legacies which are unsatisfied." 6 PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.16 at
95. Further, if the predeceased beneficiary neglected to dispose of the residue of his estate,
then the remainder interest would become part of the intestate estate. Creditors are satisfied
first out of the intestate estate. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21401-21402 (West 1991).
29. Trusts originally were created in order to avoid rules of law and enable trustors to
pass property as they saw fit. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. Today, trust
law still operates to fulfill the intent of the trustor. This is best exemplified by section 15203 of
the California Probate Code which allows a trustor to create a trust "for any purpose that is
not illegal or against public policy." CAL. PROB. CODE § 15203 (West 1991). See also infra
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names a remainder beneficiary with the expectation that this beneficiary
will outlive her and enjoy possession of the property. Of course, a benefi-
ciary who survives the trustor ultimately may pass the property to
whomever she pleases regardless of whether the trustor would approve of
her choice.30 However, in the event that the beneficiary predeceases the
trustor and never enjoys possession of the property, the trustor likely
would want to redirect to whom the trust property would pass.31 More-
over, it would be ironic if, upon the trustor's death, the trust corpus
ended up in probate under the beneficiary's will.
These undesirable consequences could be avoided through careful
planning. To ensure that a remainder interest passes to a preferred indi-
vidual, the trustor could condition the interest on the beneficiary's sur-
vival and name alternate beneficiaries to take the interest in the event
that the first beneficiary fails to survive. 32 Hence, if beneficiary A prede-
ceased the trustor, her interest would fail and immediately pass to benefi-
ciary B, the alternate. In addition, were a beneficiary to die
unexpectedly, the trustor has the power to modify the trust and name a
different beneficiary or revoke the trust entirely.33 However, trustors do
not always anticipate untimely deaths nor do they always review their
estate plan immediately upon the demise of a loved one.34 Thus, if imple-
notes 100-102 and accompanying text (discussing several recently enacted statutes designed to
give the trustor expansive control over revocable trust assets).
30. Once the beneficiary takes the interest in fee simple he may transfer or devise it to
whomever he pleases. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN
LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 23 (2d ed. 1984).
31. See Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY
L.J. 323, 327 (1988). Professor Roberts addresses a similar issue in the context of wills and
antilapse legislation:
If the devisee survives the testator even by one month, the property goes to his estate.
Why, then, should the failure to survive the testator be of such critical importance?
The testator's death, however, is not such an arbitrary point in time if the premise is
accepted that the testator probably would not want to benefit the successors-in-inter-
est of every devisee who fails to live long enough to enjoy the gift.
Id.
32. In other words, the trust provision would read, "to A if he survives me; if A fails to
survive, then to B." See HASKELL, supra note 4, at 311-12 (providing an example of a revoca-
ble living trust document in which the beneficiary's interest is conditioned upon his survival
and alternative beneficiaries are named in the event that the first named beneficiary fails to
survive).
33. The California Probate Code provides that "[u]nless a trust is expressly made irrevo-
cable by the trust instrument, the trust is revocable by the settlor." CAL. PROB. CODE § 15400
(West 1991). Further, sections 15401 and 15402 allow the trustor to revoke or modify the
trust in whole or in part "[b]y compliance with any method of revocation provided in the trust
instrument" or "[b]y a writing (other than a will) signed by the settlor and delivered to the
trustee during the lifetime of the settlor." CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15401-15402 (West 1991).
34. See Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instruments. A Blueprint for Re-
form, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 337 (1985). Professor French discusses comparable problems in
the context of wills:
Proper testamentary planning and drafting to provide alternative takers can avoid
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menting the trustor's intent is a priority, it is up to the legislature to
enact statutes that anticipate and remedy such oversights.
In the case of wills, the legislature has enacted lapse and antilapse
rules to address such oversights. Generally, if a devisee predeceases a
testator and the testator has neglected to specify an alternative devisee or
update the will, the devise lapses back to the testator's estate and passes
to the testator's residuary devisee; if there is no residuary clause, the es-
tate passes to the testator's heirs according to the rules of intestate suc-
cession.35 However, where a devisee bears some special relationship to
the testator, the law assumes that the testator would not want the gift to
lapse.36 Thus, antilapse rules prevent gifts 37 to particular people from
lapsing and usually specify to whom the gift should pass (for example, to
the deceased devisee's issue).38 Antilapse statutes vary slightly from state
to state because each state legislature must determine what the majority
of testators would have intended had they anticipated a devisee's early
death-which particular gifts a testator would not want to lapse and to
whom the testator would prefer the gift pass.39 However, despite the
current use of revocable living trusts as will substitutes, trustors are not
yet protected by remedial statutes such as the lapse and antilapse rules.
This Note addresses the problems created when the trustor of a rev-
ocable living trust fails to provide for the predecease of a remainder bene-
ficiary. Specifically, this Note shows how the revocable living trust
operates as a will, and examines how and why the rules dealing with
predeceased beneficiaries differ between wills and trusts. The Note then
proposes that because both wills and revocable living trusts serve essen-
tially the same function, the rules governing the distribution of prede-
ceased beneficiaries' gifts should be uniform. Trust beneficiaries'
remainder interests generally should be conditioned upon surviving the
trustor; if the beneficiary fails to survive the trustor, the gift should
the problem [that arises when a devisee predeceases the testator], but not all lawyers
are careful drafters and not all testators consult lawyers. Furthermore, some testa-
tors are either unable or unwilling to anticipate and to provide for the eventuality
that some or all of their intended beneficiaries will predecease them.
Id.
35. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Whenever a person dies intestate
(without a will), his property passes according to the rules of intestate succession. These statu-
tory rules specify to whom the property will pass and in what proportion. They first provide
for the surviving spouse and children and then specify a preference order of distribution for
other varying degrees of kin. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6400-6402.5 (West 1991).
36. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
37. The words "gift," "devise," and "bequest" are used interchangeably throughout this
Note to refer to testamentary gifts. In addition, "gift" also refers to remainder interests cre-
ated using revocable living trusts.
38. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
39. See French, supra note 34, at 375.
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lapse.40 Furthermore, a savings (antilapse-type) statute paralleling the
antilapse statute applied to wills should be enacted to preserve specific
trust gifts. By preserving only certain gifts and specifying to whom these
gifts should pass, the testator's intent can be better effectuated.
Part I of this Note reviews the origin of the lapse and antilapse rules
and examines how they operate in California to benefit testators and ac-
complish important state policies. Part II provides a short background
on the development of trust law and then explores why in many states
(including California) trust remainders do not lapse and antilapse stat-
utes are not applied. Part III analyzes the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in In re Estate of Button41 in which the court held that the state
antilapse statute applied to a remainder interest in a living trust. Finally,
Part IV explains how and why California should apply "lapse" and "an-
tilapse" rules to remainder interests in revocable living trusts and pro-
poses possible statutes.
I. Lapse and Antilapse Rules: Their Origin and How They
Currently Function in California
Traditionally, the lapse and antilapse rules that govern gifts passed
by will have not been applied to remainder interests in revocable living
trusts.42 However, two state supreme courts recently have held that so-
40. At common law the term "lapse" denoted only the situation in which an expectancy
failed because the devisee became "incapable of taking under the will between the time that the
will was made and the time that the testator died." PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.1, at 58. Be-
cause a trust creates a present equitable interest in the beneficiary, a trust interest would not
lapse like an expectancy, but rather it would revert back to the trustor if the beneficiary failed
to satisfy a condition (for example, a condition that he survive the trustor). See BERGIN &
HASKELL, supra note 30, at 56-57.
However, though the metaphysical mechanics of lapse and reversion differ, the two situa-
tions lead to the same result-the gift passes to the donor instead of the beneficiary. This Note
uses the term "lapse" to indicate the failure of any donee to survive the donor regardless of
whether the failure technically would constitute a lapse or a reversion. Similarly, the term
"antilapse" denotes the general concept of redirecting specific failed gifts.
In fact, neither California Probate Code section 6146 nor 6147, the "lapse" and "anti-
lapse" statutes, use the terms "lapse" and "antilapse." Rather, the statutes refer only to devi-
sees who fail to survive the testator and the persons who take in their place. See CAL. PROB.
CODE §§ 6146-6147 (West 1991).
41. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971).
42. See Randall v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 254-55,
119 P.2d 754, 757 (1941); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 516-20, 138
N.E.2d 15, 18-20 (1956) (holding that the remainder interest in a revocable living trust cannot
lapse because a trust speaks from the date of its creation and the beneficiary takes a vested
interest subject to defeasance only by the exercise of the power of revocation); Zweifel v.
Dougherty, 761 S.W.2d 215, 218-19 (Mo. App. 1988) ("[The Missouri antilapse statute] relates
only to wills and protects a limited class from lapse by reason of the prior death of a benefici-
ary named in a will before the testator. The rationale of the statute has no application to a
transfer of a present interest by deed.").
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cial policy necessitates extending the scope of antilapse statutes to protect
these remainder interests.43 To develop an understanding of the benefits
of the lapse and antilapse rules, this Part reviews the common-law con-
cept of lapse, the role of antilapse statutes in general, and the scope and
function of the California antilapse statute.
A. The Definition of Lapse and Antilapse
The law of wills is built upon certain fundamental principles, one of
which is that a will is ambulatory and speaks only as of the testator's
death.44 In practice this means that until a testator dies, her will has no
effect, and the named beneficiaries have no legal or equitable interest but
merely an expectancy.45 Thus, due to the common-law rule that prop-
erty could not be willed to a deceased person,46 if a beneficiary failed to
survive the testator and the will did not specify an alternate beneficiary, 47
the bequest was deemed ineffective and was said to "lapse."'4  This
means that the bequest passed back to the testator's estate49 and was
distributed according to the residuary clause or, depending upon the cir-
cumstances, the rules of intestate succession.5 0
43. Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Turner, 39 Ohio St. 3d 182, 184-85, 529 N.E.2d 1261,
1263-64 (1988); In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 853-55, 490 P.2d 731, 734 (1971).
The courts in both Button and Dollar recognized that, in practice, revocable living trusts are
used like wills to effect a post-death transfer. Dollar, 39 Ohio St. 3d at 184, 529 N.E.2d at 1263
("[U]pon the death of the settlor, the intervivos trust was transformed into a testamentary
instrument."); Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854,490 P.2d at 734 ("A gift to be enjoyed only upon or
after the death of the donor is in practical effect a legacy, whether it is created in an inter vivos
instrument or in a will."). Both courts then reasoned that interpreting lapse and antilapse
legislation to apply to trusts would further the intent of the legislature. Dollar, 39 Ohio St. 3d
at 184, 529 N.E.2d at 1263; Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854-55, 490 P.2d at 734 ("RCW 11.12.110
declares the policy of the law of this state, and that policy is against the lapsing of gifts to
relatives of the deceased.... [T]here being no conflicting statutory provision, a statute cover-
ing gifts by will which would lapse in the absence of the statute, applies to gifts provided in a
trust.").
44. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLs 2 (2d ed. 1953).
45. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 80-85.
46. Roberts, supra note 31, at 324 (citing LEWIS SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 80 (2d ed. 1966)).
47. The lapse rule does not operate if the testator names an alternate devisee to take the
gift in the event that the first named beneficiary fails to survive the testator. See infra notes 75-
78 and accompanying text.
48. 6 PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.1, at 58. Professor Page explains that at common law
[lapse] refers to a legacy or devise which would have taken effect if the testator had
died the instant after he executed the will; but which fails because the devisee or
legatee has, in some way, become incapable of taking under the will between the time
that the will was made and the time that testator died.
Id. Professor French describes lapse as "a fairly common [problem] because there is often a
considerable period of time between the execution of a will and the death of the testator,
during which some of the intended beneficiaries may die." French, supra note 34, at 336-37.
49. ATKINSON, supra note 44, at 777.
50. Id.; see also French, supra note 34, at 337 ("Before the adoption of antilapse statutes,
[Vol. 43
The common-law lapse rule often produced harsh consequences that
defeated the intent of the testator.-" For example, if a testator left the
bulk of his estate to his child and that child predeceased the testator, the
gift would lapse. Instead of passing to the testator's grandchildren (the
children of the predeceased child), the gift would lapse back to the testa-
tor's estate and be distributed according to the residuary clause. A gift
most likely intended to provide for the testator's issue might pass to a
beneficiary already amply provided for, to a beneficiary that the testator
had only intended to favor minimally, or to the testator's creditors.5 2 An
undesired distribution might also occur if there were no residuary clause
and the lapsed property passed through intestate succession. For exam-
ple, if a testator devised property to his brothers and sisters and one sib-
ling predeceased the testator, that sibling's share would pass not to his
issue but rather according to the rules of intestate succession. This might
result in one branch of the family receiving a disproportionate share of
the estate.5 3
To counter the often unintended and undesired results of the lapse
rule, England and a majority of American states enacted antilapse legis-
lation.5 4 Antilapse statutes are "based upon the presumption that the
testator would have made provision for certain relatives of the deceased
beneficiary, if his attention had been called to the death of the benefici-
ary, and he had had the opportunity to make such provision." 55 In gen-
eral, antilapse statutes prevent the lapsing of gifts to devisees with whom
the testator has a particular familial relationship by providing for a statu-
torily designated substitute devisee.5 6 However, there is no standard an-
tilapse statute. Because each state has devised a rule based on its own
the death of a devisee before the death of the testator caused the property to pass under the
residuary clause or, if there was no residuary clause, by intestacy.").
51. French, supra note 34, at 337-40 (describing several instances in which lapse frus-
trated the intent of the testator primarily by passing property out of a family or passing prop-
erty disproportionately to different branches of a family).
52. See supra note 28.
53. Professor French contends that "the usual testator probably would prefer to avoid
lapse when the lapsed devise would pass out of the family, or when it would pass to surviving
family members in an overall distribution that resulted in substantially unequal treatment of
the family branches." French, supra note 34, at 337-38.
54. 6 PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.10, at 77. See Roberts, supra note 31, at 324-25 n.3
(citing the antilapse statutes for each state). Currently Louisiana is the only state that has no
antilapse statute. Id at 324. The first antilapse statute in the United States was adopted by
Massachusetts in 1783. French, supra note 34, at 335 n.3, 338-39.
55. 6 PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.10, at 77.
56. Antilapse statutes provide "a substituted devisee who is a living person and who takes
in place of the deceased devisee." LEwIs M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS § 79 (2d ed. 1966).
Professor Roberts explains that "[m]ost lapse statutes apply only to deceased devisees
who are related to the testator and most substitute the issue of the deceased devisee." Roberts,
supra note 31, at 324, 328.
July 1992] ANTILAPSE STATUTE
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notion of what the average testator would have intended, antilapse stat-
utes vary widely in scope.
Different states have selected different key relationships as well as
different substitute devisees. 57 For example, the Uniform Probate Code
prevents the lapse of gifts devised to a grandparent or a lineal descendant
of a grandparent of the testator.5 8 This would encompass gifts devised to
the testator's parents, brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, aunts and
uncles, and cousins, as well as the devisee's own children and grandchil-
dren. If one of these particular devisees dies before the testator but is
survived by issue, then the predeceased devisee's issue would inherit the
gift as if she were the original devisee.5 9 Under the Uniform Probate
Code, the key relationship provision requires that the predeceased devi-
see be a grandparent or lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testa-
tor. If the key relationship exists, the statutorily designated substitute
devisee will be the predeceased devisee's issue. Depending upon the
scope of the particular antilapse statute, if the key relationship exists, and
if there is a substitute devisee living, then the statute VAil operate to
"save" the devise and pass it directly to the substitute devisee; if the key
relationship does not exist or there is no living substitute devisee, then
the devise will lapse back to the testator's estate. Thus, antilapse statutes
function to carry out the presumed intent of the testator where a devisee
fails to survive.
B. Lapse and Antilapse in California
Today in California, the common-law lapse rule is codified as sec-
tion 6146 of the Probate Code, which provides that "[a] devisee who fails
to survive the testator or until any future time required by the will does
not take under the will." ° Though the statute makes no reference to
"lapse," it does impose a general requirement (comparable to the com-
57. Professor French illustrates the wide variety of antilapse statutes:
The statutes range from those covering only gifts to children of the testator to those
that cover gifts to anyone. In between these two extremes, there are statutes that
only apply to lineal descendants, those that apply both to lineal descendants and to
siblings, those based on Uniform Probate Code § 2-605, .. . those limited to heirs of
the testator, those that apply to any blood relative to the testator, one that includes
the testator's spouse, lineal descendants, and collaterals within six degrees, and those
that apply both to blood relatives and to relatives by affinity.
The statutes also vary as to the identity of the takers substituted for the intended
beneficiary. Maryland substitutes the heirs or devisees of the predeceased taker,
Iowa substitutes the heirs except for the spouse, and all other states substitute the
issue. The statutes also differ in their application to void gifts, and to void class gifts.
French, supra note 34, at 344-45. Professor French has created a chart highlighting the differ-
ences among the various state antilapse statutes. See id. at 375 app.
58. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605 (1992).
59. Id.
60. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6146 (West 1991).
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mon-law rule) that the devisee outlive the testator. Thus, whereas histor-
ically lapse occurred as the unfortunate result of a common-law
technicality,61 the California Legislature deliberately enacted a statutory
survival requirement for devisees-in essence reproducing the common-
law lapse doctrine by legislative decree. Further, whereas lawmakers ini-
tially created antilapse statutes in an effort to mitigate the undesired con-
sequences of lapse, antilapse statutes have come to be more than merely a
reaction to lapse. The California Legislature might have corrected the
lapse rule by eliminating it. Instead, it chose to codify both the lapse and
antilapse rules. By requiring that all devisees survive the testator and
then creating specific exceptions to the rule, California uses lapse and
antilapse to control which gifts will succeed and which will fail based on
its determination that the probable intent of the majority of testators is to
keep wealth in the family.62 Gifts to predeceased nonrelatives lapse back
to the testator's estate and are disposed of according to the testator's
residuary clause (or to her heirs), while gifts to statutorily designated
predeceased relatives do not lapse but rather pass directly to the prede-
ceased devisee's issue pursuant to the antilapse rules.
Without lapse and antilapse rules, gifts to predeceased devisees,
whether relatives or nonrelatives, would pass to whomever happens to be
named in the predeceased devisee's residuary clause (or to her heirs if she
left no will). Were the California Legislature to abolish both the lapse
and antilapse statutes, whenever a devisee failed to outlive the testator,
property actually would pass twice: first from the testator to the de-
ceased devisee's estate, and then second from the deceased devisee's es-
tate to her residuary beneficiaries or to her heirs (or in the absence of
beneficiaries or heirs, the gift would escheat to the state). Once the gift
has passed out of the testator's estate and into the deceased devisee's
estate, the likelihood is great that the gift would pass to a beneficiary not
of the original testator's choosing.63 Further, the gift would be probated
twice-once through the testator's will and again through the prede-
ceased devisee's estate. Hence, in California lapse and antilapse statutes
function together to keep gifts in the immediate family and avoid double
probate.
While no constructional rule can be totally effective in realizing the
intent of the testator who fails to express his wishes clearly, the current
California system of passing gifts directly to a predeceased devisee's issue
would probably meet the approval of most testators. Children of rela-
tives and spouses are provided for, while gifts that would pass outside of
61. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
62. "The choice of deceased devisees to whom the lapse statute applies is based on the
legislature's decision as to the presumed intent of the testator." Roberts, supra note 31, at 327.
63. See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text (pointing out the pitfalls of property
passing through a deceased devisee's estate).
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the family are reincorporated into the testator's estate. 64 The California
antilapse statute prevents the lapse of devises to "kindred of the testator
or kindred of a surviving, deceased, or former spouse of the testator" 65
when the deceased kindred devisee is survived by issue.66 In other
words, in order for the antilapse statute to save the gift, the predeceased
beneficiary must be: (a) the kindred of the testator or of the testator's
surviving, deceased, or former spouse, (the key relationship) and (b) sur-
vived by issue (the statutorily designated substitute devisee). If both of
64. Professor French proposes that the antilapse statute be further refined so as to take
into account the nature of the overall dispositive plan in order to distinguish the situations in
which lapse would be prevented from those in which it should be permitted to occur. See
French, supra note 34, at 371-73. Such a revision would anticipate the intent of testators even
more accurately. Because the intent of the trustor is similar to the intent of the testator, any
changes made to the antilapse statute for wills should be incorporated into an antilapse statute
for revocable living trusts.
65. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1991). "[Kindred] refers to persons related by
blood. In general, an adoptee is kindred of the adoptive family and not of the adoptee's natu-
ral relatives." 20 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N, REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES
OF 1989-1990, at 1431 (1990) (citing Estate of Goulart, 22 Cal. App. 2d 808, 35 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1963)) (citation omitted). If the testator were to make a devise to a stepchild who predeceased
the testator, section 6147 creates a substitute gift to the issue of the predeceased stepchild. Id.
at 1431; Roberts, supra note 31, at 333 (statute applies to step-children and in-laws but not to
spouses). Professor French explains the seeming anomaly that section 6147 passes property to
the issue of stepchildren and in-laws but not to the issue of the testator's spouse:
If the testator made a gift to in-laws, there is no doubt that he intended to include at
least some people outside his nuclear family or blood relations. If the gift is to a
spouse, however, the situation is different. Empirical studies show that testators in
overwhelming proportions leave their property to the surviving spouse. They do so
even when they have children who are not also children of that spouse, although with
lesser frequency. In this situation, if the spouse predeceases, it usually would not be
the testator's intent to pass the property to the issue of the predeceased spouse rather
than to the testator's own issue. Hence, there is a reluctance to include spouses
within the antilapse statute's coverage.
French, supra note 34, at 357-58.
66. Section 6147 provides:
(a) As used in this section, "devisee" means a devisee who is kindred of the testator
or kindred of a surviving, deceased, or former spouse of the testator.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c), if a devisee is dead when the will is executed, or is
treated as if he or she predeceased the testator, or fails to survive the testator or
until a future time required by the will, the issue of the deceased devisee take in
his or her place in the manner provided in Section 240 [intestate succession]. A
devisee under a class gift is a devisee for the purpose of the subdivision unless the
devisee's death occurred before the execution of the will and that fact was known
to the testator when the will was executed.
(c) The issue of a deceased devisee do not take in his or her place if the will expresses
a contrary intention or a substitute disposition. A requirement that the initial
devisee survive for a specified period of time after the death of the testator consti-
tutes such a contrary intention. A requirement that the initial devisee survive
until a future time that is related to the probate of the will or administration of
the estate of the testator constitutes such a contrary intention.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147 (West 1991).
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these prerequisites are met, and the testator has not expressed a contrary
intent, the devise will pass directly to the predeceased beneficiary's issue
avoiding a second probate;67 if not, the devise lapses back into the testa-
tor's estate.
It is essential to note that the devise does not pass under the prede-
ceased beneficiary's will, because it is not the predeceased beneficiary's
interest that the legislature seeks to protect.68 The devise may pass only
to the predeceased devisee's issue in order to protect the probable
(though unstated) intent of the testator: to provide for the children of his
kindred. 69 Further, the devise passes directly from the testator to the
predeceased devisee's issue; the issue stand in the shoes of their parent. 70
The gift is "substitutional and direct from the testator, rather than deriv-
ative through the original legatee.' ' 71 This direct transmission is impor-
tant because by passing directly to the predeceased devisee's issue, the
gift is neither subject to debts other than those of the testator 72 nor pro-
bated a second time 73 under the devisee's will.74
The antilapse statute never overrides the express intent of a testa-
tor.75 For example, if a testator anticipates the untimely death of a devi-
see and provides for an alternate taker, the antilapse statute would not
take effect: "To my child A, but if A fails to survive me then to X, my
67. See infra text accompanying notes 70-74.
68. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 103; 6 PAGE, supra note 24, §§ 50.10-50.12.
69. 6 PAGE, supra note 24, §§ 50.10-50.12. Professor Effland illustrates how the antilapse
statute operates to anticipate the testator's unexpressed intent:
A will devises property to testator's daughter Jane. Jane dies before the testator but
leaves issue who survive the testator. No words in the will address what to do if the
daughter predeceases. A testator who had considered such a possibility would have
specified who was to take if the daughter predeceased. We can only conclude that
this particular testator never considered his daughter's early death. Should the de-
vise fail or should it go to Jane's issue? Most testators would want Jane's issue to
take the devise intended for Jane and a statutory rule of construction, the anti-lapse
statute, operates to reach that result.
Richard W. Effiand, Will Construction Under the Uniform Probate Code, 63 OR. L. Rtv. 337,
338 n.2 (1984).
70. ATKnsoN, supra note 44, at 777, 783.
71. Id
72. Id at 783.
73. Id
74. Roberts, supra note 31, at 327. Professor Roberts explains:
[T]he basic survival requirement [that a devisee survive the testator] has practical
aspects. It avoids any possible argument for the need to administer the property in
the estate of the predeceased devisee, and avoids the problem that arises if the heirs
or devisees of the deceased devisee also predecease the testator.
Id
75. Roberts, supra note 31, at 326, 346 (citing 6 PAGE, supra note 24, § 50.11). Professor
Roberts explains that "[ildeally, lapse statutes would never apply because the draftsmen would
anticipate the possibility that the devisee might predecease the testator and alternative provi-
sions would be made." Id. at 346 n.92.
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favorite charity." Here, the testator has expressed her wishes by specify-
ing an alternate taker. Therefore, even if A is survived by issue, the anti-
lapse statute will not operate to pass the devise to them because the gift
will not have failed. Similarly, the antilapse statute will not take effect if
the testator expressly requires that the devisee survive-"to my child A if
she survives me." Because the testator intentionally forces the gift to
lapse in the event of A's untimely death, the antilapse statute will not
operate to save it.76 Rather, antilapse statutes operate solely as gapfilling
measures, 7 anticipating the intent of the forgetful or neglectful testator
who fails to provide for the possibility that her beneficiaries VAil not out-
live her.78
If antilapse statutes effectuate the intent of the forgetful testator,
why are they not applied to revocable living trusts as well? Revocable
living trusts commonly are used to pass property like a will.79 Accord-
ingly, the intent of the majority of trustors should be substantially similar
to the intent of the majority of testators. Moreover, just as a testator
may neglect to name an alternate devisee, a trustor may neglect to name
an alternate remainder beneficiary. Yet, with the exception of two states,
antilapse statutes are not applied to ameliorate such oversights in revoca-
ble living trusts.80 The next Part explores this apparent anomaly.
I, Revocable Living Trusts: Their Origin and Wihy A tflapse
Statutes Are Not Applied to Them
Like the law of wills, the law of trusts is aimed at carrying out the
intent of the trustor.81 Yet, often the gapfilling legislation governing
wills is not carried over to trusts. This Part summarizes the development
of trust law and then examines why California courts hold that remain-
der interests in a living trust do not lapse and hence antilapse statutes
cannot be applied.
76. Roberts, supra note 31, at 349.
77. Effland, supra note 69, at 338 n.2; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6140 (West 1991)
("(a) The intention of the testator as expressed in the will controls the legal effect of the dispo-
sitions made in the will. (b) The rules of construction expressed in this article apply where the
intention of the testator is not indicated by the will.").
78. Roberts, supra note 31, at 325 ("Lapse statutes are remedial measures that attempt to
effectuate intent when drafters fail to anticipate lapse by expressly providing for alternative
takers.").
Simply having a residuary clause would not necessarily effectuate the intent of the testa-
tor. The residuary cannot anticipate which particular devisee might happen to suffer an un-
timely death. In contrast, the antilapse statute passes the gift directly to the issue of the
particular relative who predeceases the testator. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 67.
80. The Ohio and Washington Supreme Courts have both held that revocable living trust
interests may lapse and that the state antilapse statutes apply. See supra note 43.
81. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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A. The "Peculiar Character" of Trusts
Professor Austin Wakeman Scott, author of a multi-volume treatise
on trusts, attributed the "peculiar character" of the trust to "the more or
less accidental circumstance that in England in the fifteenth century, and
for four hundred years thereafter, there were separate courts of law and
equity."' 82 Whereas a judgment at law created rights in the plaintiff, a
decree in equity imposed personal duties upon the defendant.83 Thus,
while A might possess the legal title to property, B could appeal to the
court of equity to compel A to exercise her legal rights for B's benefit. 84
Professor Scott explains how the concept of the trust continued to de-
velop: "the courts of equity went further than merely to impose personal
duties on the holder of the legal title. They gave the beneficiary an inter-
est in the property and gave him protection in the enjoyment of that
interest. The result is something unique: a double form of ownership."85
In other words, a trustee holds legal title to a property while a beneficiary
owns an equitable interest in the same property-hence, "double owner-
ship." Eventually courts held that there could be estates in uses86 and
that equitable interests in land could descend to the holder's heirs. 87
Like a legal interest, this equitable interest is devisable, descendible, and
transferrable.18
Thus, upon the creation of a trust today, the beneficiary takes a
present equitable interest. This equitable interest endows the beneficiary
with certain rights against the trustee,89 even though actual enjoyment of
82. 1 ScoTT & FRATCHEP, supra note 1, at 3.
83. Id at 3-4.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id Professor Scott explains that the chancellor did not at first expressly create a
system of equitable ownership. Rather,
he spoke as though he were merely compelling the trustee to act in accordance with
the dictates of conscience. But before the end of the fifteenth century he had held
that the interest of the beneficiary would be protected against purchasers with notice
of his interest, against the heir of the trustee, and against gratuitous transferees.
Id at 5.
86. A "use" was the precursor of the modem trust. Professors Bergin and Haskell illus-
trate the workings of the early use:
By using the magical words "to the use of 0 and his heirs," 0 created between
himself and T a relationship of trust that was deemed by the Court of Chancery to be
morally binding on T. The words "to the use of 0 and his heirs" mean, roughly, "for
the purposes of 0 and his heirs." Thus, T holds a legal estate in fee simple in the
property subject entirely to the control of 0! If T fails to carry out any instruction of
O's concerning the property, 0 has merely to ask the Court of Chancery to order T
to comply. If T disobeys the order, he may be fined or jailed for contempt.
BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 30, at 82-83.
87. 1 ScOT & FRATCHER, supra note I, at 6.
88. Id.
89. Professor Haskell explains:
The basic characteristics of a trust are (i) the division of legal and equitable title, and
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possession of the trust assets may be postponed (as is the case when a
revocable living trust is used as a will substitute). Generally, each indi-
vidual trust agreement defines the scope of the beneficiary's rights, but a
beneficiary has the power to enforce the trust.90 Further, the beneficiary
may devise her equitable interest, or it may descend to the beneficiary's
intestate heirs. 91 Thus, whereas a will confers no rights until the testator
dies,92 a trust creates an immediate interest making the beneficiary an
equitable owner of the trust res.93
B. The Modem Revocable Living Trust
Today numerous specialized types of trusts have evolved to serve a
variety of specific functions. 94 In particular, the revocable living trust is
widely used as a will substitute and has developed into a sort of will-trust
hybrid.95 "Living trust" refers to a trust created during the trustor's life-
time as opposed to a testamentary trust that is created by a will and
becomes operative only at the trustor's death.96 Using a living trust, a
trustor may simulate a will by giving herself a beneficial life interest in
the trust property and designating beneficiaries to receive the remainder
at her death. The trustor may appoint herself as trustee and life benefici-
ary with broad powers over the trust income.97
In addition, like a will, a revocable living trust may be revoked or
modified for any reason and at any time before the trustor's death.98
Thus, although the beneficiary takes a present equitable interest in the
(ii) the fiduciary responsibility of the holder of the legal title to the holder of the
equitable title. The person owning absolute title to property creates the trust by a
special type of transfer which separates the equitable title from the legal title and
imposes fiduciary responsibility upon the legal title holder.
HASKELL, supra note 4, at 69.
90. Ia at 77.
91. LEwis M. SImEs & ALLAN F. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 1883,
1902 (2d ed. 1956).
92. ATKINSON, supra note 44, at 2.
93. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 69.
94. 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, at 40.
95. See Langbein, supra note 2, at 1113; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-26.
96. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 69. Professor Haskell defines a testamentary trust as
one created under a validly executed will of a testator. It is a property transfer that
takes effect at death by virtue of judicial action admitting the will to probate....
[T]he formal requirements for the creation of the testamentary trust are the formal
requirements for the execution of a will, and the required capacity to create a testa-
mentary trust is the same as the capacity required for the execution of a will. The
trustee and beneficiaries of the testamentary trust are legatees and devisees under the
will, and the assets which are bequeathed and devised in trust are first subject to
estate administration in the same fashion as assets which are bequeathed or devised
absolutely.
Id. at 74.
97. HASKELL, supra note 4, at 81-82.
98. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15400-01 (West 1991).
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trust, the interest is limited in that, like the expectancy created by a will,
the beneficiary's interest in the trust exists entirely at the discretion of the
trustor. While in theory a beneficiary may sue to enforce the trust, in
practice the beneficiary would have difficulty enforcing any rights against
the trustee during the trustor's life because the trustor simply could re-
voke the trust and terminate the beneficiary's rights.99 In this sense, the
idea of a trust interest as a form of equitable ownership has been cur-
tailed radically by the desire to achieve the ambulatory quality of the
will.
This evolution of the revocable living trust from a traditional trust,
in which the beneficiary takes an immediate equitable interest that con-
fers genuine rights of recourse, to a will-like devise, in which the interest
conferred constitutes little more than an expectancy, is reflected in recent
California legislation that acknowledges the tentative nature of the re-
mainder beneficiary's interest and limits the beneficiary's rights accord-
ingly. Section 15800 of the Probate Code specifies that as long as the
trust is revocable, "[t]he person holding the power to revoke, and not the
beneficiary, has the rights afforded beneficiaries under this division....
The duties of the trustee are owed to the person holding the power to
revoke." 1°° Section 15801 gives the trustor and not the beneficiary "the
power to consent or withhold consent... in any case where the consent
of a beneficiary may be given or is required."10 1 Section 15802 provides
that "during the time a trust is revocable.., a notice that is to be given
to a beneficiary shall be given to the person holding the power to revoke
and not to the beneficiary."10 2 These sections, enacted in 1986, demon-
strate a legislative trend toward formal recognition that the interest
which a remainder beneficiary holds under a revocable living trust is ex-
tremely limited-more closely resembling an expectancy than ownership.
Thus, the trust beneficiary's interest has come almost full circle, growing
99. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Langbein, supra note 2, at 1127
(citing Farkas v. Williams, 3 Ill. App. 2d 248, 121 N.E.2d 344 (1954)).
100. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15800 (West 1991). The California Law Revision Commission
commented:
This section has the effect of postponing the enjoyment of rights of beneficiaries of
revocable trusts until the death or incompetence of the settlor or other person hold-
ing the power to revoke the trust.... Section 15800 thus recognizes that the holder
of a power of revocation is in control of the trust and should have the right to enforce
the trust.
18 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS OF 1985, at 501, 657 (1986).
101. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15801 (West 1991). Section 15801 "recognizes the principle that
the consent of the beneficiary of a revocable trust should not have any effect during the time
that the trust is presently revocable, since the power over the trust is held by the settlor or
other person holding the power to revoke." 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMNIM'N, supra note 100, at
1775.
102. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15802 (West 1991). "[Slection [15802] recognizes that notice to
the beneficiary of a revocable trust would be an idle act in the case of a revocable trust since
the beneficiary is powerless to act." 15 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N, supra note 100, at 658-59.
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from a moral obligation to complete equitable ownership, and then, in
the form of the revocable living trust, waning back toward a largely nom-
inal interest.
C. Applying Antilapse to Revcable Living Trusts: The Vesting Dilemma
Though in practice a revocable living trust endows the remainder
beneficiary with an extremely tenuous interest, it is this limited equitable
interest that prevents the lapse and antilapse rules from operating. In
Randall v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 103 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a gift to a remainder beneficiary was a
vested remainder and that the interest was indefeasible unless the trustor
revoked the trust.104 In Randall, the trustor, Ward, created a revocable
living trust giving himself a life estate and directing that upon his death
the trust corpus should pass to Randall. Randall died six months before
Ward, leaving his wife as his sole heir at law. Because Randall's remain-
der interest in Ward's trust was a devisable interest which vested imme-
diately upon the creation of the trust, and because upon Randall's death
his entire estate passed to his wife, upon Ward's death the trust corpus
passed to Randall's wife as heir to Randall's remainder interest.105
The Randall court recognized that there exists a constructive prefer-
ence to consider remainders to be "vested." 10 6 Further, the term
"vested" has been construed to preclude any implied conditions of survi-
vorship.10 7 Thus, absent an express survival condition, a remainder ben-
eficiary need not survive the trustor. Consequently, death did not divest
the beneficiary, Randall, of his interest.108 Early vesting precluded
"lapse," so that even when the beneficiary predeceased the trustor, his
equitable interest survived and passed according to the beneficiary's will
or to his intestate heirs.109
103. 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 119 P.2d 754 (1941).
104. Id. at 255, 119 P.2d at 757.
105. See id. at 254-55, 119 P.2d at 757.
106. Id. at 255, 119 P.2d at 757 (citing Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 642-43, 154
P. 306, 309 (1915)); Miller v. Oliver, 54 Cal. App. 495, 498, 202 P. 168, 169 (1921); In re De
Vries, 17 Cal. App. 184, 190, 119 P. 109, 112 (1911).
107. SIMES, supra note 56, § 91. See also Randall, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 119 P.2d at
757. Though the decision is sparse, the court in Randall interpreted "shall vest" as designat-
ing an interest not subject to any condition of survival. Specifically, the court wrote that "the
words 'shall vest'. . . support[] the existence of a vested remainder even though enjoyment is
postponed and even though the power of revocation or substitution might divest the benefici-
ary at any time of the right to possession which otherwise would upon the trustor's death pass
to him." Id. (emphasis added). The word "otherwise" seems to indicate that the court
deemed "vesting" to preclude an implied survival condition. In fact, the court never consid-
ered implying such a condition.
108. Randall, 48 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 119 P.2d at 757.
109. See id. at 255, 119 P.2d at 757 ("Upon the death of Ward [the trustor] the vested
remainder in interest of Randall [the remainder beneficiary] passed to his wife as his sole heir,
and her right to enforce the trust followed.").
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The court acknowledged that, like an expectancy under a will, the
remainder's vested interest in a revocable living trust is subject to revoca-
tion or modification at any time and for any reason as long as the trustor
is alive.110 In essence, the will and the living trust accomplish the same
task, and the testator and trustor manifest similar intent. Furthermore,
the California Legislature has determined the majority of testators' intent
and given it effect in the antilapse statute."' But despite the similarity
between the intent of the testator and that of the trustor of a revocable
living trust, the Randall court treated the trust remainder interest differ-
ently because it was "vested." ' "12 Unlike a will, the probable intent of the
neglectful trustor is not considered. Thus, under the current California
interpretation, vesting would appear to present an insurmountable road-
block to applying an antilapse statute to revocable living trust
remainders.
IM. Vesting and Other Dilemmas Revisited: An Alternative
Perspective
Professor Scott described the trust as "a great instrument of law
reform."' 13 He pointed out that historically, equity was "a far more flex-
ible system than that of legal ownership. Uses were created for the very
purpose of obtaining this flexibility and avoiding the application of the
rules of law.' ' H 4 Where the chancellors determined that a rule of law
merely served to further an unsound or obsolete policy, they used the
trust to circumvent that rule.1 5 Thus, uses, or trusts, accomplished "law
reform" in that "[e]quity refused to follow the technical legal rules gov-
erning the creation of estates. These rules rested upon feudal conceptions
that, although they still flourished in the courts of law, were no longer
required by public policy.""16 Sound rules that promoted desired social
policy were retained while obsolete rules could be discarded as inapplica-
ble to trusts."X7
110. Id. Because the law prefers vested remainders over contingent remainders, the trust
beneficiary's interest is said to be a vested remainder subject to being defeased-or in other
words, vested unless the trustor revokes or modifies the trust. lad
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112. If Ward had devised the property to Randall, then upon Randall's untimely death the
gift would have lapsed back to Ward's estate because Randall was not survived by issue. If
Ward had devised the property to Randall and Randall had left surviving issue, then the anti-
lapse statute would have saved the gift and distributed it to Randall's issue regardless of who
Randall named as residuary devisee in his will. See 6 PAGE, supra note 24, §§ 50.2, 50.12.
113. 1 Sco-r & FRATCHER, supra note 1, at 7.
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 16.
117. While it was determined that a trust could not be used to evade a creditor or secure a
monopoly to suppress competition, a trust could be used to avoid the feudal claims of an
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Today, many legal scholars appear to have forgotten the very flexi-
bility that made trusts the "great instrument of law reform." Instead of
considering furtherance of sound social policy, which was the original
role of the trust, these scholars place overriding emphasis upon the
"technical legal rules governing the creation of estates."""8 Lapse and
antilapse statutes are not applied to revocable living trusts because his-
torically -there has been a constructional preference for vested remain-
ders; older definitions of "vested" require that there be no implied
condition of survivorship. 119 In other words, regardless of whether there
is a sound policy reason for applying lapse and antilapse to revocable
living trusts, a historically based technical rule prohibits lapse. This Part
examines how one court held that because the goals of the trustor and
the testator are the same, the same state policy governing gifts by will
should apply to gifts by trust.
A. The Example of Washington State
In 1971, the Washington Supreme Court in In Re Estate of But-
ton 120 broke new ground when it held that the state antilapse statute ap-
plied to save a remainder beneficiary's gift under a revocable living
trust.1 21 The case involved a revocable living trust established by Robert
Button in 1940. The trust instrument read in part:
Upon the death of the Trustor without having withdrawn the entire
fund, the balance of investments and cash remaining in the trust fund
shall be delivered to the Trustor's mother, Audrey A. Burg, and her
receipt for the residue of said trust fund shall thereupon release the
Trustee from any further responsibility therefor. 122
No alternate disposition of the trust property was made in the event that
Mrs. Burg should predecease her son.12 3 Mrs. Burg died intestate on
November 15, 1966, predeceasing Robert Button who died only 13 days
later without revoking or modifying the trust.1 24 Thus, the primary
question before the court was "the proper disposition of the trust prop-
erty, the only named beneficiary of the 1940 trust (other than the trustor
himself) having died prior to the death of the trustor."1 25
The court ruled that the state antilapse statute operated to save the
predeceased beneficiary's interest. Accordingly, the court awarded the
overlord or to dispose of land by devise (at a time when land was not devisable) because these
purposes were no longer contrary to public policy. Id. at 7-8.
118. See supra text accompanying note 116.
119. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
120. 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490 P.2d 731 (1971).
121. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 734.
122. Id. at 850, 490 P.2d at 732.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 851, 490 P.2d at 732.
125. Id. at 853, 490 P.2d at 734.
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trust property to the descendants of Audrey Burg. 126 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court determined that "a gift to be enjoyed only upon or
after the death of the donor is in practical effect a legacy, whether it is
created in an inter vivos instrument or in a will.' 1 27 It then declared that
the Washington antilapse statute, which on its face applied only to wills,
embodied a state policy "against the lapsing of gifts to relatives of the
deceased.' 128 Thus, having decided that an intervivos revocable trust
serves the same basic function as a will, the court held that because there
was "no conflicting statutory provision, a statute covering gifts by will
that would lapse in the absence of the statute, applies to gifts provided in
a trust."' 29
In contrast to the California court in Randall, 130 the Washington
court declined to address whether the gift was vested,13 1 stating that,
"Whether or not the interest of Audrey A. Burg [the remainder benefici-
ary] had vested prior to the death of the trustor, it was subject to be
divested if she died before the trustor died."' 132 To enforce the state pol-
icy set forth in the antilapse statute,1 33 the court simply imposed upon
the remainder a condition that she survive the trustor in order to take the
gift. 134 In other words, regardless of when the remainder's interest
comes into being or whether it is vested, the interest is conditioned on the
126. Id at 855, 490 P.2d at 735. One critic characterized the Button decision as "a need-
less public policy snipe hunt," conjecturing that the court could have reached the same result
by applying future interest law. Note, Inter Vivos Trusts--The Washington Testamentary Anti-
Lapse Statute Applied to an Inter Vivos Trust In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 490
P.2d 731 (1971), 47 WASH. L. REv. 743, 749 (1972). That the award would have been the
same without resorting to use of the antilapse statute seems to strengthen the idea that Button
was more than a shortsighted, result-oriented decision.
127. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854, 490 P.2d at 734. The court reasoned that if the bequest
had been made by testamentary trust, the antilapse statute would have affected it, and "the
only difference between such a gift and that involved here is that the inter vivos trust disposes
of property upon the death of the settlor without the necessity of complying with the statute of
wills." Id But see infra text accompanying note 141.
128. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854, 490 P.2d at 734. The court stated that the Washington
antilapse statute "declares the policy of the law of this state, and that policy is against the
lapsing of gifts to relatives of the deceased. This does not mean that a testator or trustor
cannot provide for a different disposition. If he does, of course, the statute has no applica-
tion." Id.
129. Id. at 855, 490 P.2d at 734.
130. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
131. The court of appeals had decided that Mrs. Burg's interest was vested and that there
could be no condition that she survive Robert Button. In re Estate of Button, 4 Wash. App.
773, 775, 483 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1971). The supreme court disagreed with this analysis: "We
do not examine the propriety of the conclusion that [Audrey Burg's] interest had vested, since
we are of the opinion that that conclusion does not answer the question whether that interest
was intended to pass to her heirs upon her death." 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 734.
132. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 735.
133. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 735.
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remainder surviving the testator; if the remainder predeceases the testa-
tor, the interest "lapses."
B. Button Attacked
Critics argue that the Washington court should have held that at the
moment the trust was created, the beneficiary took a vested remainder
and that "vested" means the remainder beneficiary need not survive the
trustor.135 The fact that the trustor could revoke the trust gift at any
time before his death would merely make the remainder vested subject to
defeasance. 136 Therefore, upon the beneficiary's death (whether before or
after the trustor's death), the remainder interest should have descended
according to the beneficiary's will or the laws of intestacy.1 37 In response
to the Button court's reasoning that the revocable living trust remainder
interest "is in practical effect a legacy,"1 38 Professor Robert Fletcher
exclaimed:
Can the court be serious in saying that an "intervivos trust disposes of
property upon the death of the settlor"? An intervivos gift may indeed
create an interest, such as a remainder, that comes into enjoyment
upon the death of the settlor, but that interest was created intervivos,
and no authority holds otherwise. 139
In contrast to a devise, which has no legal effect until the testator dies,
the trust gift cannot lapse because it is vested, albeit defeasibly, from the
creation of the trust.140 As Professor Fletcher contends:
Lapse ... and the anti-lapse statutes designed to protect against it, are
thus consistent with the ambulatory nature of a will and the fact that it
135. See Robert L. Fletcher, A Critical Note on Lapse, 8 GONZ. L. R~v. 26, 26-27 (1972);
see also J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Anti-Lapse Statute as Applicable to Interest of Beneficiary
Under Inter Vivos Trust Who Predeceases Life-Tenant Settlor, 47 A.L.R.3d 358, 360-61 (1973);
Note, supra note 126, at 745 (1972).
136. Kemper, supra note 135, at 361; Note, supra note 126, at 745 (citing First Nat'l Bank
v. Tenney, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956)).
137. See Kemper, supra note 135, at 360-61 (citing First Nat'l Bank, 165 Ohio St. 513, 138
N.E.2d 15). Professor Kemper explains that the court should properly have held:
(1) that under the trust involved, the settlor retained a life estate and his mother-to
whom the trust property was to be paid over at his death-took a vested remainder,
subject to defeasance in the event that the settlor revoked the trust during his life-
time; (2) that such vested remainder descended to the heirs-at-law of the mother
upon her death, subject to the same condition as to defeasance by revocation; and (3)
that upon the death of the settlor without having revoked the trust, the remainder
interest of the mother's heirs became absolute.
Id.; see also Fletcher, supra note 135, at 26-27 (arguing the court erred in asserting that the gift
required the donee to survive the donor to come into enjoyment and that the mother's interest
should have passed on her death to her successors in interest); Note, supra note 126, at 745-46.
138. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854, 490 P.2d at 734.
139. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 31.
140. See Kemper, supra note 135, at 363; see also Fletcher, supra note 135, at 27, 30 (A
trust interest would never lapse in the common-law sense of the term; rather, the interest
would revert.). But see supra note 40.
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does not become operative until the death of the testator, and are
seemingly inconsistent with the concept of a transaction in praesenti
creating valid existing interests in property in favor of a trustee and a
designated beneficiary or beneficiaries, which is fundamental to the es-
tablishment of an intervivos trust. 4 1
Critics thus argue that, unlike the beneficiary under a will, there is no
need for the trust remainder to survive the trustor to take a gift; the
interest already exists and is subject only to revocation by the trustor.
C. Button Revisited
Essentially, the Washington Supreme Court simply dismissed the
entire issue of whether the interest was defeasibly vested or contingent as
irrelevant to the question of whether the beneficiary must survive the
trustor. 142 Instead, it focused on the functional similarity of wills and
revocable living trusts:
[T]he only difference between such a gift [a bequest] and that involved
here is that the inter vivos trust disposes of property upon the death of
the settlor without the necessity of complying with the statute of
wills.... A gift to be enjoyed only upon or after the death of the
donor is in practical effect a legacy, whether it is created in an inter
vivos instrument or in a will.143
Whereas Professor Fletcher concentrates on the historical metaphysical
distinction between the disposition of property via the will versus the
trust,1 " the Washington court completely ignored this distinction, and
instead, emphasized the practical fact that trustors use revocable living
trusts to dispose of property at death. The court cited this fact as the
basis of its decision to apply the state antilapse statute to the trust re-
mainder. 145 Thus, the following questions remain: Is the Washington
court's reasoning sound and the result desirable; and if so, how can a
similar result be achieved in California?
While the Washington court deemed the issue of vesting completely
irrelevant to its decision,' 46 the California court in Randall v. Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, under a similar set of facts,
based its decision solely upon the finding that the gift was vested. 147 The
discrepancy most likely results from the fact that "vesting" has been
stretched to describe a variety of different situations.' 48 One scholar
141. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 26; see also Note, supra note 126, at 744 (arguing that the
court in Button effectively dissolved the distinction between testamentary and intervivos gifts).
142. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 734-35.
143. Id at 854, 490 P.2d at 734.
144. See Fletcher, supra note 135, at 31.
145. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854, 490 P.2d at 734.
146. Id at 855, 490 P.2d at 734-35.
147. Randall v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 48 Cal. App. 2d 249, 254-55, 119
P.2d 754, 757 (1941). See supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
148. Professor Ferrier noted that "[t]he word 'vest' unquestionably merits the Hohfeldian
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identified five different uses of the term "vesting."' 149 Generally, how-
ever, it is agreed that technically,
[a] future interest is vested if it meets two requirements: first, that
there be no condition precedent to the interest's becoming a present
estate other than the natural expiration of those estates that are prior
to it in possession; and second, that it be theoretically possible to iden-
tify who would get the right to possession if the interest should become
a present estate at any time. I5 °
Instead of adopting this technical definition of vesting and then analyzing
whether a survival requirement also existed, the California court inter-
preted vesting to preclude a condition of survival. 151
In fact, as the Washington court explained in Button, vesting does
not necessarily negate a condition of survival; 152 there is no reason that
the constructional preference for vesting should prevent the imposition of
a condition of survivorship. For example, though the trustor of a revo-
cable living trust may revoke a beneficiary's interest at any time, the re-
mainder is still said to be vested. The power to revoke the trust is merely
a condition subsequent to the vesting of the remainder which may com-
pletely divest the remainder, thus making the interest vested subject to
defeasance.1 53 Similarly, a survivorship condition need not be read only
as a condition precedent to vesting, but rather may be read as a condition
subsequent to the vesting of the remainder. The condition might read,
epithet 'chameleon-hued,' a characterization which that learned legal writer and scholar evi-
dently reserved for juristic terms of 'convenient and seductive obscurity.'" William W. Fer-
rier, Jr., Implied Condition of Survivorship in Gifts of Future Interests in California, 40 CAL. L.
REv. 49, 61 (1952) (citing Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld's description of the term "license" as
"chameleon-hued" in Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66, 92
(1917)).
149. Professor Ferrier explains:
In the first place there is the highly technical (sometimes termed, 'feudal') meaning,
particularly applicable to remainders which are subject to no condition precedent.
Secondly, vested may connote indefeasibly vested, applying to an interest which is
not only vested in the first sense but also is not subject to any divesting condition
subsequent. In the third place, vest may refer to the vesting in possession or enjoy-
ment rather than in interest or right. Fourth, vested may be used to designate a
transmissible interest, that is, one which is not subject to any condition of survival,
whether or not it is subject to any other condition precedent. Fifth, vested may refer
to a right or interest claimed to be entitled to some particular protection under doc-
trines of constitutional law.
Id. (citing THOMAS JARMAN, JARMAN ON WILLS 1325-30; VALTER B. LEACH, CASES ON
FUTURE INTERESTS 255-56 (2d ed. 1935); LEwis M. SIMES, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTER-
ESTS § 347 (1936). As to the fifth meaning, see Spreckles v. Sprecldes, 116 Cal. 339,48 P. 228
(1897); THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS 745 (8th ed. 1927)); JOHN C.
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITiES § 118 (4th ed. 1942).
150. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 30, at 66-67.
151. See supra note 107. This corresponds with Professor Ferrier's fourth definition of
vested. See supra note 149.
152. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d. 849, 855, 490 P.2d 731, 735 (1971).
153. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 30, at 70-71.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 43
ANTILAPSE STATUTE
"to 0 for life, then to A if A survives 0," (a condition precedent) or "to
O for life, then to A; but if A does not survive 0 then the gift reverts to
0" (a condition subsequent).
Read as a condition subsequent, a survivorship condition does not
preclude vesting. 154 Even with a survivorship condition, the two vesting
requirements are still met: there is no condition precedent to the interest
becoming a present estate (other than the natural expiration of those es-
tates that are prior to it in possession), and it is theoretically possible to
identify those who would get possession if the interest should become a
present estate. 155 If the beneficiary failed to survive the trustor, either
the "antilapse" statute would save the interest for the beneficiary's issue
or, if the beneficiary had no issue, the interest would revert back to the
trustor's estate. Regardless of when the beneficiary dies, "we will always
be able to point to a specific living person or to a specific group of living
people and say, 'The possession goes there.' "156 Accordingly, the Wash-
ington court was correct in holding that the preference for vesting does
not necessarily prevent the court from imposing a condition of
survivorship.
Yet, while the Washington court's conclusion that vesting does not
preclude conditions is correct, it failed to discuss why the survivorship
condition should attach. Without explanation or analysis, the court
merely assumed that a beneficiary must survive the trustor or the remain-
der interest will lapse. 157 The court instead focused on examining why
the antilapse statute should save the interest. Much of the criticism of
Button may arise from the court's failure to acknowledge that it imposed
a condition of survivorship on the beneficiary.1 58 While technically the
interest may fail, the Washington court neglected to explain why and
how in fact it did fail. The court applied the antilapse statute without
explaining how the gift lapsed in the first place.
It is unclear whether the court knew that it was imposing the sur-
vival condition. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the court
stated that "[i]t was the rule at common law that a gift in trust lapsed
upon the death of the beneficiary prior to the death of the trustor."' 59
Actually, the Restatement refers only to testamentary trusts.16 Thus,
154. See SiMs, supra note 56, § 11, at 20 ("It should be noted that the existence of a
divesting condition does not make a remainder contingent. If the condition is subsequent and
not precedent, then the remainder is vested.").
155. See supra text accompanying note 150.
156. BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 30, at 67.
157. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 26 ("The court's first error was in asserting, without
discussion, that the gift required the donee to survive the donor in order to come into
enjoyment.").
158. See, ag., id
159. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 853, 490 P.2d 731, 734 (1971) (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 cmt. f at 245 (1959)).
160. The Restatement reads:
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the court would have been incorrect if it thought that the Restatement
expressly imposed a survival condition upon the beneficiaries of living
trusts. Later in the decision, when discussing the applicability of the an-
tilapse statute, the court did acknowledge the difference between a testa-
mentary trust and an intervivos trust, but it determined that because the
antilapse statute would apply to testamentary trusts and because both
living trusts and testamentary trusts dispose of property upon a trustor's
death, the statute should apply to both.161 Regardless, the thrust of the
opinion is that instruments that perform similar functions should be gov-
erned by the same policy considerations.1 62 While the Washington court
may have skipped a step in its reasoning, its premise that "vesting" does
not preclude a survival condition is consistent with the definition of
vesting. 163
As to the wisdom of implying a survival condition, by holding that
legislative determinations regarding the probable intent of testators
should apply as aptly to trustors, the Washington court addressed the
issue realistically. It reasoned that instruments that function similarly
should be governed by a uniform policy. 164 In practice, revocable living
trusts are widely used as will substitutes,1 65 and courts have accepted this
practice to the extent that the trust is not used for fraudulent purposes. 166
Far from evolving away from the will, the revocable living trust has
steadily assumed more and more will-like characteristics.1 67 While the
trustor's control over his life interest as well as his power to revoke and
modify the trust has increased, the beneficiary's rights have decreased.1 6
A trustor may retain the power to revoke or modify the trust.169 More-
over, the trustor may declare that the predecease of the beneficiary shall
operate as a revocation of the trust. 170 It is even acknowledged that, in
practice, the power to revoke the trust renders the exercise of the benefi-
ciary's "rights" unfeasible.1 71 In fact, most courts, as well as the Califor-
[I]f a testator devises property in trust for a person who predeceases him, the devise of
the beneficial interest lapses, and the person named as trustee ordinarily holds the
property upon a resulting trust for the estate of the testator. By statute, however, in
many states a devise does not lapse under certain circumstances, as for example if the
devisee leaves a child; and under similar circumstances a devise of the beneficial inter-
est under a trust does not lapse.
RESTATEMENNT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 cmt. fat 245 (1959) (emphasis added).
161. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 855, 490 P.2d at 734.
162. See supra notes 126-134, 142-143 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 152-156.
164. Button, 79 Wash. 2d at 854-55, 490 P.2d at 734.
165. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
166. Farkas v. Williams, 3 Ili. App. 248, 121 N.E.2d 600 (1954).
167. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.B.
168. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
170. 2 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, at 396.
171. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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nia Legislature, have acknowledged and endorsed the use of revocable
living trusts as nonprobate wills by a growing segment of the public.172
By implying a condition of survival, the court in Button caused re-
mainder interests to behave like expectancies where the beneficiary pre-
deceases the trustor. The court then applied the antilapse statute to the
remainder interest just as the statute would apply to a failed expectancy.
The court's decision to force the remainder interests of predeceased bene-
ficiaries to "fail" and then extend the antilapse statute to save certain of
the failed interests recognizes the similarity between revocable living
trusts and wills and the need for consistent distributions. 173 It deter-
mined that the policy promulgated by the state legislature concerning
wills was to save only gifts to specific predeceased relatives. 174 Had the
court held that in the case of revocable living trusts, gifts to all benefi-
ciaries should be saved, the court would have sacrificed consistency
merely to maintain an artificial distinction between the role of wills and
revocable living trusts. Extending lapse and antilapse rules to revocable
living trusts protects the neglectful trustor who fails to modify her trust
upon the early death of a beneficiary just as it protects the neglectful
testator who fails to amend her will.
IV. Why and How Should California Follow Washington? A
Legislative Proposal to Extend the California Antilapse
Statute to Revocable Living Trusts
A fundamental aim of wills and trust legislation is to anticipate and
effectuate the intent of the donor. 175 The California Legislature has de-
termined that testators most often desire that gifts remain within the im-
mediate family and generally wish to provide for the deceased
beneficiary's issue.176 Based on this assumption, the legislature promul-
gated the lapse and antilapse rules, which narrowly control to whom a
gift will pass in the event that a devisee predeceases the testator and the
testator's will fails to anticipate such an occurrence. 177 Yet, in Califor-
nia, revocable living trusts, which operate like wills, are treated differ-
ently. 178 This Part explains why California should follow Washington's
example and apply lapse and antilapse rules to revocable living trusts. It
asserts that such a change should be affected through legislation and pro-
poses model statutes.
172. See supra notes 100-102, 164-166 and accompanying text.
173. See In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 855, 490 P.2d 731, 734 (1971).
174. Il at 854, 490 P.2d at 734.
175. See supra notes 29, 77-78 and accompanying text.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 62, 64-74.
177. See supra Part I.B.
178. See supra Part II.C.
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A. Why California Should Follow Washington
The rules of lapse and antilapse should be extended to revocable
living trusts in order to effectuate the intent of trustors as well as to
achieve consistency and uniformity. No statutory provision exists for the
trustor who fails to anticipate the early death of the beneficiary; upon the
trustor's death the remainder interest is distributed according to the ben-
eficiary's will (assuming the beneficiary has a will). At best, the deceased
beneficiary knew she held an equitable interest and provided for its dispo-
sition; this would lead to the property being probated. At worst (and
probably more likely), the deceased beneficiary was ignorant of the inter-
est and failed to make a conscious provision for it, unwittingly directing
the residue of her estate to a less favored heir. In addition, if the de-
ceased beneficiary has been dead for some time, the gift may be dissipated
by the expense of trying to trace to whom it should pass. 179 For instance,
if the deceased beneficiary's residual beneficiary is also dead, there may
be a chain of interests to trace: "Practitioners will be aware that chains
of beneficial interest always end with relatives in Australia. ' 180
The types of problems created by trust gifts passing according to
predeceased beneficiaries' wills are analogous to the problems that ulti-
mately necessitated revision of the first English antilapse statute. Under
the old English antilapse provision, gifts to devisees related by blood
were saved and passed according to the devisee's will 18 1 (as opposed to
the California antilapse statute which passes gifts only to issue regardless
of the deceased devisee's will).18 2 While gifts to relatives were saved
from lapse, the intent of the testator often was thwarted when the gift
passed to a stranger named in the deceased devisee's will.18 3 As one
179. As of 1991, the Uniform Probate Code extends lapse and antilapse to will-substitutes.
SELECTED STATUTES ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 135 (John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Wag-
goner eds., 1991). The editors explain that the rationale for adopting the provisions "is to
prevent cumbersome and costly distributions to and through the estates of deceased benefi-
ciaries of future interests, who may have died long before the distribution date." Id. at 139.
180. A.W. Brooke, Section 33 of the Wills Act 1837: A Reminder, 125 SOLIC. J. 368, 369
(1981).
181. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 33 (Eng.) As quoted in Brooke, supra
note 180, at 368, the Wills Act reads:
Where any person being a child or other issue of the testator to whom any real or
personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed for any estate or interest not determi-
nable at or before the death of such person shall die in the lifetime of the testator
leaving issue and any such issue of such person shall be living at the time of the death
of the testator, such devise shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such
person had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary
intention shall appear by the will.
182. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying notes 67-69.
183. Mr. Brooke provides a humorous illustration of how a bequest could go awry if it
passed according to the deceased devisee's will:
When, let us say, a son of a testator dies before the testator leaving an only daughter
who survives the testator, then that daughter's existence will save the gift from lapse.
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critic of the statute explained, "it would be an irrational family where
parents made their own wills so as to carry out the wishes of a child
already deceased, irrespective of their own, merely because these had
been the wishes of their child."1 s4 In addition, passing property accord-
ing to the will of a long since deceased devisee created tracing problems
in that if a devisee "died many years ago it is not unlikely that the benefi-
ciaries of his estate will also have died." 1 5
In response to these problems, Parliament changed the English anti-
lapse statute to specify that the gift pass only to the issue of a blood
relative devisee, a class of recipients favored by the majority of testa-
tors.18 6 Similarly, imposing lapse and antilapse rules on revocable living
trusts would better effectuate the intent of the neglectful, forgetful, or ill-
advised trustor by more closely controlling to whom the predeceased
beneficiary's interest will pass. In addition, passing the remainder inter-
est directly to the predeceased beneficiary's issue prevents it from being
probated under the beneficiary's will. And, after all, avoiding probate
most likely was the impetus for choosing to create a revocable living trust
instead of a will.
In contrast, Professor Robert Fletcher argues that there is no need
to apply the antilapse rule to trusts. Professor Fletcher maintains:
[I]n the case of a will, the legislative substitution is made in the belief
that the testator's failure to change his will to take into account the
legatee's death was due to neglect or oversight, or, perhaps, to illness
or to shortness of time between the legatee's death and the testator's
death. People are of course expected to keep their wills up-to-date, but
knowing that many do not, the legislature has provided substitute tak-
ers in these limited circumstances.
Contrast the situation of an intervivos gift .... [The trustor]
makes his disposition all at one time, once and for all, and the interests
come into existence the moment he makes the gift. If the donor wants
to provide for alternate persons to take in enjoyment upon contingen-
cies that may happen in the future, he may do so ... but he need not
cover every possibility. If he wishes, he may make an incomplete dis-
position; he thereby retains a reversionary interest. 8 7
While Professor Fletcher is correct that a trust passes a present interest
as opposed to an expectancy, this has little to do with the likelihood that
a trustor, like a testator, may fail to anticipate a future event when creat-
ing the trust or may neglect to revoke or modify the trust upon the early
The daughter, however, may not necessarily benefit. If the son, by his will, chose to
leave his estate to the cats' home, then to the cats' home the legacy will go.
Brooke, supra note 180, at 368.
184. Id. at 370.
185. Id. at 368.
186. Ross Sundberg, Some Aspects of Testamentary Lapse, 58 LAw INST. J. 104, 105
(1984).
187. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 29-30.
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death of a beneficiary. The fact that it is possible to draft a trust that
anticipates all contingencies and reflects the trustor's intent does not pre-
clude drafters from failing to provide for such contingencies. Professor
Fletcher assumes that the trustor understands all of the ramifications of
creating a present interest. The trustor may not want a gift to pass under
a deceased beneficiary's will any more than the testator would want a gift
to lapse back to the testator's estate. Antilapse statutes are designed spe-
cifically to anticipate and correct drafting oversights and thus are equally
applicable to revocable living trusts.
The California Legislature has determined to whom the majority of
testators would prefer property to pass.188 This determination should
apply equally to the trustor of a revocable living trust. The revocable
living trust has evolved into a widely used will substitute-a means for
disposing of property at an individual's death.189 Although Professor
Fletcher argues that "[tlhe intervivos gift has few of the characteristics of
a gift by will [because] [u]nlike a will, it is a present transaction, with
nothing tentative or transient about it,"19o this really only holds true in
form, not practice. In practice, the revocable trust interest is tentative
and transient-very much like a gift by will. The revocable trust benefi-
ciary holds solely at the whim of the trustor and only at the trustor's
death is the beneficiary's interest safe from revocation by the trustor. 191
Denying that this instrument behaves more like a will than a trust and
insisting that similar situations be treated differently in order to create an
artificial rift between wills and trusts is unrealistic. Though testamentary
formalities and probate courts were once necessary in order to avoid
fraud and protect testators, they have become cumbersome, confusing,
time consuming, and expensive.1 92 Hence, testators have turned to revo-
cable living trusts as a way to circumvent the less desirable aspects of the
will.
Originally, trusts were created to avoid "the application of rules of
law."193 Courts of equity retained those laws that they deemed reflective
of current social policies while refusing to follow laws that had become
obsolete. 194 That the revocable living trust has developed into a will sub-
stitute is not a problem to be remedied but merely carries on the tradi-
tional role of the trust-that of an instrument of law reform. Just as the
fifteenth century chancellors valued sound policy over obsolete technical-
ities, today's legislators should continue to do so by extending the lapse
and antilapse rules to revocable living trusts.
188. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
190. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 30.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
192. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
193. 1 Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 1, at 6.
194. Id. at 7.
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B. The Legislative Solution
The Washington court achieved uniformity by implying that a trust
interest fails when the beneficiary predeceases the trustor and holding
that the state antilapse statute applies to these trust interests.19 5 While
the imposition of a condition does not necessarily run contrary to the
constructional preference favoring early vesting, such a legal reform is
more appropriately carried out by the legislature than by the courts.
Criticism of Button centered not around the result that the Washington
Supreme Court reached, but on the liberties the court took in reaching
the result.196 The antilapse statute is a remedial rule that attempts to
anticipate intent. Hence, the lawmaking body is best suited to determine
the trustor's intent and resolve whether the imposition of an implied con-
dition of survivorship in conjunction with an antilapse-type statute
would further this intent. 197 In addition, the current California antilapse
statute refers to "devisees" and "testators." 198 These specific references
to testamentary instruments would seem to preclude California courts
195. In re Estate of Button, 79 Wash. 2d 849, 855, 490 P.2d 731, 734 (1971). But see Note,
supra note 126, at 748-49 (The author contends that applying antilapse leads to inconsistency.
Instead of addressing the similarity between wills and revocable living trusts and the corre-
sponding need to attain uniform results between the two instruments, the author argues that
antilapse would cause the revocable living trust to yield different results than it has in the
past.).
196. For example, Professor Fletcher writes:
With no attention to legislative background, with little or no argument on the point,
with no opposite authority, and no dissent, the Washington Supreme Court held in
Button's Estate that an intervivos gift perfected 26 years before the donor's death
"lapsed" when, later, the donee of an indefeasibly vested interest in the property died
before the donor died. Then, most remarkable of all, the court held that the anti-
lapse statute was to be used to determine the new owners of the gift previously given
26 years earlier!
Fletcher, supra note 135, at 26 (citations omitted).
197. It is the legislature that has the resources to determine the intent of the populace and
the authority to codify it. Recent changes in California trust law are
the result of an intensive study, analysis, and revision of trust law by the California
Law Revision Commission and its staff over a period of more than three years (the
study is part of the major revision of the entire Probate Code that is not yet com-
pleted). During this period the Commission submitted the studies, reports, com-
ments, and tentative drafts of proposed statutes to a broad segment of the California
Bar for review, comment, and criticism. The tentative, revised, and final drafts of
every section of the proposed law were submitted to the Executive Committee of the
Estate, Planning, Trust, and Probate Section of the State Bar of California for review
and comment. Members and advisors of that committee attended almost every meet-
ing of the Law Revision Commission in which this law was proposed, revised, and
approved.
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 15000-18508 note (CEB 1992) (Development Notes Author's comments
on Division 9 of the Probate Code, appearing at the beginning of the division).
198. Section 6147(a) provides, "As used in this section, "devisee" means a devisee who is
kindred of the testator or kindred of a surviving, deceased, or former spouse of the testator."
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6147(a) (Vest 1991) (emphasis added).
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from interpreting the antilapse statute as referring to revocable living
trust remainders. 199 Thus, instead of calling for the courts to ignore the
plain meaning of the lapse and antilapse statutes, which would obscure
the scope of the statutes and expose the decision to criticism, the legisla-
ture should enact statutes that unequivocally apply to revocable living
trusts.
The California Legislature should enact a general requirement that
the interest of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable living trust be con-
ditioned upon the beneficiary surviving the trustor. Once the survival
condition is established, a savings (antilapse-type) 200 statute must be en-
acted. To obtain maximum uniformity, the statutes should be modelled
directly from the California lapse and antilapse provisions.201 The
"lapse" statute for revocable living trusts might read as follows:
(a) All revocable living trust remainder interests shall be conditioned
upon the beneficiary surviving the trustor or until any future time
required by the trust.
199. But see Dollar Sav.& Trust Co. v. Turner, 39 Ohio St. 182, 183-84, 529 N.E.2d 1261,
1263 (1988) (holding that the state antilapse statute should apply to revocable living trust
remainders despite the fact that the statute employed the specific terms "devise, .... testator,"
and "will" and reasoning that because the revocable living trust is used as a testamentary
instrument, public policy against the lapsing of testamentary gifts should apply to the revoca-
ble living trust).
200. The term "savings" is used because the statute would only simulate the antilapse rule.
"Lapse" denotes only a failed expectancy. A trust remainder would not lapse; rather, the
implied condition of survivorship would cause the interest to revert back to the trustor. See
supra note 40. The implied condition of survivorship merely simulates lapse so that the revo-
cable living trust will behave consistently with a will. Thus, because a revocable living trust
remainder technically does not lapse, there also can be no antilapse. For this reason the Note
has used the term "savings" to refer to a statute that imitates the antilapse rules by saving
certain remainders that would revert due to the survivorship condition.
201. In her article Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reforra, Pro-
fessor French states that "antilapse statutes generally produce good results when they operate
to maintain equality within the family and prevent property from passing outside the family."
French, supra note 34, at 362. However, she also describes a number of instances in which the
current California antilapse statute might not effectuate the testator's intent. Id. at 353-63.
She asserts that "[l]apse does not always produce intent-defeating distributions, and the rela-
tionship of the devisee to the testator is not alone a sufficient basis for discriminating among
the situations in which devises should and should not lapse." Id. at 373. In order to decrease
the instances in which the antilapse statute actually subverts the testator's dispositive plan,
Professor French proposes adopting the "probable intent" doctrine
in which the court seeks the disposition the particular testator probably would have
wanted by considering any relevant admissible evidence ....
... Under this suggested approach, the statute uses both the identity of the
beneficiaries and the nature of the dispositive plan to distinguish the situations in
which lapse should be prevented from those in which it should be permitted to occur.
Id. Professor French's proposed antilapse statute would seem to improve upon the current
rule as it is more finely tailored toward effectuating the intent of each individual testator. If
the California legislature remodels section 6147 on the "probable intent" doctrine, any revoca-




(b) In the absence of a contrary provision in the trust:
(1) If it cannot be established by clear and convincing evidence
that the beneficiary has survived the trustor, it is deemed that
the beneficiary did not survive the trustor.
(2) If it cannot be established by clear and convincing evidence
that the beneficiary survived until a future time required by the
trust, it is deemed that the beneficiary did not survive until the
required future time.202
The savings or "antilapse" statute might read as follows:
(a) As used in this section, "beneficiary" means a beneficiary who is
kindred of the trustor of a revocable living trust or kindred of a
surviving, deceased, or former spouse of the trustor of a revocable
living trust.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c), if a beneficiary is treated as if he or she
predeceased the trustor, or fails to survive the trustor or until a
future time required by the trust, the issue of the deceased benefici-
ary take in his or her place in the manner provided in Section 240
[intestate succession]. A beneficiary under a class gift is a benefici-
ary for the purpose of the subdivision unless his or her death oc-
curred before the execution of the trust and that fact was known to
the trustor when the trust was executed.
(c) The issue of a deceased beneficiary does not take in his or her place
if the trust expresses a contrary intention or a substitute disposi-
tion. A requirement that the initial beneficiary survive for a speci-
fied period of time after the death of the trustor constitutes such a
contrary intention.20 3
V. Conclusion
Just as centuries ago trusts were conceived to circumvent antiquated
yet firmly entrenched property laws, revocable living trusts now are be-
ing used to accomplish a sort of home-made probate reform. By creating
revocable living trusts, trustors are able to "devise" property while avoid-
ing the probate system. Because the main goal of switching from a will
to a revocable living trust is to avoid probate, the dispository intent of the
trustor should remain the same as that of the testator. Accordingly, if we
accept the premise that the dispository intents are the same, then we
should strive to assure consistent dispositions. If the legislature enacted
the lapse and antilapse rules based on the intent of the testator, and if the
intent of the testator and the trustor are the same, then lapse and anti-
lapse rules should be applied to revocable living trusts as they are applied
to wills.
Although the Washington and Ohio courts have interpreted anti-
lapse statutes to apply to revocable living trust remainders, the decisions
have been widely criticized as going beyond the bounds of statutory in-
202. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6146 (West 1991).
203. See id. § 6147.
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terpretation. The California courts are unlikely to follow Washington
and Ohio and "rewrite" the California lapse and antilapse statutes. Nor
should they. Rather, the responsibility rests with the legislature. The
California State Legislature already has enacted provisions limiting the
rights of revocable living trust remainder beneficiaries, thereby acknowl-
edging that such a remainder interest is more akin to an expectancy than
a true equitable interest. This Note proposes that the legislature move a
step further and adopt "lapse" and "antilapse" statutes for revocable liv-
ing trusts comparable to those now applied to wills. Such parallel stat-
utes should help ensure that, in avoiding probate, the trustor does not
end up giving away her property to strangers.
